In this paper, we consider a natural procedure of decision-making, called a "Grouping Choice Method", which leads to a kind of bounded rational choices.
Introduction
To construct models to explain (seemingly) irrational choices of individuals or societies is one of the central themes in economic theory recently. In this paper, we consider a natural procedure of decision-making, called "Grouping Choice Methods", which leads to a kind of bounded rational choices. In this procedure, a decision-maker (DM) first divides the set of available alternatives into some groups and in each group she chooses the best element (winner) for her preference relation. Then, among the winners in the first round, she selects the best one as her final choice.
Such choice behaviors are often observed in real life. For example, suppose that a family would like to buy a house. Three houses {x, y, z} are available, of which x and y are located in town A, and z in town B. They first choose the best house in each town, and then make a final choice from the "winners" in the first round. Suppose that they prefer x to y, y to z, and z to x. 1 Now, when y and z are available, each of them is the only house in each town.
Hence, y is chosen from {y, z} because they prefer y to z. On the other hand, when all three houses are available, they first choose x as the best house in town A since they prefer x to y. Because z is the only house in town B, hence the best, the set of winners in the first round is {x, z}. Then they choose z because they prefer z to x. Thus, z is selected from {x, y, z}. Notice that the family's preference relation is cyclic in this example and yet a final choice can be determined by this procedure of choice with grouping. However, these choices are inconsistent with Samuelson's (1938) Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP), which requires that if y is chosen when z is available, then z should not be chosen whenever y is available.
In this paper, we formalize and analyze decision-making procedures as described above. First, we define a grouping rule as a correspondence that specifies for each set S of available alternatives a grouping in S (a set of subsets of S). Several natural requirements are imposed on admissible grouping rules. 1 Note that a family's preference relation may become cyclic because it is a collective preference relation (if they decide by majority voting, for instance).
We assume that each DM is endowed with a single preference relation. Given a grouping rule and a preference relation, and for each set of available alternatives, a Grouping Choice Method first takes a maximal element in each group in the set for the preference relation, and then selects a maximal element among these first-round maximums.
We characterize Grouping Choice Methods in three different ways. First, we show that a choice function is a Grouping Choice Method if and only if it is a Rational Shortlist Method (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007) in which the first rationale is transitive. In Rational Shortlist Methods, a DM is endowed with two preference relations, called "rationales", and for each set of available alternatives, she sequentially applies the two rationales to make the selection.
Second, we axiomatically characterize Grouping Choice Methods. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) showed that Rational Shortlist Methods are characterized by a weak version of WARP and a standard choice-consistency property under the expansion of the set of alternatives, simply called "Expansion". Their
Weak WARP requires that if an alternative x is chosen in binary comparison
with y, as well as in a set S containing both x and y, then y should not be chosen in any "intermediate" set T between {x, y} and S (that is, {x, y} ⊆ T ⊆ S). Because the class of Grouping Choice Methods is a restricted class of Rational Shortlist Methods, Grouping Choice Methods also satisfy Weak WARP and Expansion. In addition to the above two axioms, we introduce a new axiom called "Elimination". This property means that if an alternative y is never chosen in the presence of another alternative x, then (i) whenever y is chosen in a menu (without x) and then x becomes newly available, x should be chosen in the new menu, or (ii) whenever y and x are present, eliminating y from the menu dose not affect the choice. We show that these three axioms fully characterize Grouping Choice Methods. In the literature, the papers close to this part of our results are Au and Kawai (2011) and Horan (2013).
Both of them characterize Rational Shortlist Methods in which both of the two rationale are transitive by distinct sets of axioms respectively. Horan (2013) also provides a characterization of Rational Shortlist Methods in which the first rationale is transitive (and the second is unrestricted) by a list of axioms that is different from ours. 2 Third, we consider a weak version of Path Independence, which we call Grouping Path Independence. The original version of Path Independence was introduced by Plottt (1973) . It means that final outcomes should be independent of the "paths" to lead to them. To describe our version, assume that a grouping rule G and a set S of available alternatives are given. As an example, let the groups specified by G for S be G(S) = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. Consider the following path to a final choice: first, apply a choice rule C to each group S i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) to select an alternative C(S i ); second, apply the rule to the set of the alternatives selected from the groups in the first round, namely
let us change the path either by merging or by splitting some groups in the original grouping G(S) = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. For instance, by merging S 1 and S 2 , we obtain {S 1 ∪ S 2 , S 3 } as the new grouping. Then, apply the choice rule C the same way as above, but under the new grouping in S. Grouping Path Independence requires that this type of change in grouping should not affect the final
Grouping Path Independence and the original version of Path Independence require the final choice to be unchanged with changes in the grouping of the set of available alternatives. The difference between the two conditions is that the former considers only departures by merging or by splitting from the initial groups specified by the given grouping rule, whereas the latter allows any changes in grouping. Hence, our version is weaker than the original one. We show that, given a grouping rule G, a choice function satisfies Grouping Path Independence for G if and only if it is a Grouping Choice Method with G and some preference relation. 2 In the first version of Horan (2013) , he characterizes Rational Shortlist Methods in which the first rationale is transitive by Expansion, Weak WARP, and the axiom called "Choice Symmetry".
In the latest version which we have just known, he strengthens our Elimination axiom and defines the axiom called "Exclusivity". Then, he provides a characterization by means of Expansion and Exclusivity.
In the literature on individual or social decision-making, many authors have proposed and studied models to explain choice behaviors that are inconsistent with single preference maximization over the sets of feasible alternatives.
Among them, sequential applications of multiple criteria are often considered in both individual and social choices. 3 It is interesting that choices by sequential maximization of two rationales with the first one being transitive may be alternatively described as decision-making by single preference maximization with a grouping procedure. The two distinct procedures may explain the same set of choice outcomes.
Manzini and Mariotti (2012b) consider yet another decision-making procedure that looks similar to ours. In their procedure, a DM first "categorizes" alternatives. Here "categorization" is the same as "grouping" in our procedure. In their model, however, a DM is endowed with two distinct preference relations, one over the "categories" (subsets of the set of alternatives) and the other over alternatives. Then, she first eliminates all alternatives in categories dominated by another category, and chooses an alternative that is maximal among the remaining ones. In contrast to their model, a DM is endowed with a single preference relation over the alternatives in our model, just like the standard choice theory. Our point of departure from the classical theory is to introduce a grouping process before maximization.
In social choice contexts, agenda setting is crucial for determining final outcomes, especially when a social preference relation contains cycles as in the case of majority voting. Here agenda setting is the same as grouping in our model. Hence, our results may shed some light on bounded rationality of social choice under various agenda settings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic notation and definitions, and defines Grouping Choice Methods. Sections 3, 
Grouping Choice Methods
First, we introduce basic notation and definitions throughout the paper. Let X be a finite set of alternatives, and X the set of all nonempty subsets of X. A choice function is a function C : X → X such that for every S ∈ X , C(S) ∈ S. A binary relation (or rationale) on X is a set P ⊆ X × X. For simplicity, (x, y) ∈ P is written as x P y. A binary relation P is asymmetric if x P y implies not[y P x]. Let P be the set of all asymmetric binary relations on X.
We say that x ∈ X and y ∈ X with x ̸ = y are comparable in P ∈ P if x P y or y P x holds. An asymmetric binary relation P ∈ P is complete if for all x, y ∈ X with x ̸ = y, x and y are comparable in P . It is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X, x P y and y P z implies x P z. It contains a cycle if there exist an integer n with n ≥ 3 and n alternatives x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X such that x i P x i+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and x n P x 1 . It is acyclic if it contains no cycle.
For each P ∈ P and each S ∈ X , let M (S; P ) ⊆ S denote the set of maximal elements in S for P : M (S; P ) = {x ∈ S |̸ ∃y ∈ S such that y P x} .
For each S ∈ X , let |S| denote the number of elements in S.
Next, we introduce a new procedure of decision making, which we call a "Grouping Choice Method". In this procedure, a DM first divides the set of feasible alternatives into some groups, and from each group, she selects an element (winner). Then, she chooses an element among the winners in the first round. In order to formally define the new procedure, we first introduce "grouping rules".
Definition 1.
A grouping rule is a correspondence G that associates with every S ∈ X a family G(S) of subsets of S, and that satisfies the following three conditions. At first, all houses are available, and they divide X into {x, y} and {z, w} by location. But then, w is sold so that S = {x, y, z} becomes the new set of available houses. Then, if they still divide S according to location, {x, y} should be a group in S. That is, x and y are always in a group as long as both are available. Condition (G3) requires this kind of consistency in grouping procedures. Now we are ready to define our new decision procedure.
Definition 2. A choice function C is a Grouping Choice Method if and only if there exist a grouping rule G and an asymmetric binary relation
P such that for every S ∈ X , C(S) = M (∪ S k ∈G(S) M (S k ; P ); P ).
Grouping Choice Methods and Sequential Applications of Multiple Criteria
Sequential applications of multiple criteria in individual or social choices have been studied by many authors as cited in the Introduction. In this section.
we clarify the relationship of Grouping Choice Methods with the models of sequential applications of multiple criteria.
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) defined and analyzed Rational Shortlist Methods. In the Methods, a DM is endowed with a pair of preference relations, called "rationale", and for each set of available alternatives, she first takes all maximal elements for the first rationale in the set, then among these elements, she selects the maximum for the second rationale. An obvious difference of Grouping Choice Methods from Rational Shortlist Methods is that a DM is endowed with single preference relation in the former, whereas with two preference relations in the latter. Despite this difference, there is a strong connection between the two methods of choice. Our first theorem shows that a choice function is a Grouping Choice Method if and only if it is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive. It is interesting that the same set of choice outcomes may be explained in either of the two models of decision-making: the model of sequential maximization with a pair of rationales and that of maximization of a single preference relation with a grouping procedure.
Theorem 1. A choice function is a Grouping Choice Method if and only if it is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive.
It is worth noting the relationship of two rationales in a Rational Shortlist Method with the single preference relation in the corresponding Grouping Choice Method. Let a pair of rationales (P 1 , P 2 ) be given. Construct the single preference P 12 as follows: For all x, y ∈ X, x P 12 y ⇔ x P 1 y or [not(y P 1 x) and x P 2 y].
The preference relation P 12 was defined and studied in Tadenuma (2002) and Houy and Tadenuma (2009) , and called the lexicographic composition of (P 1 , P 2 ). In this composition, an alternative x is superior to another alternative y if and only if (1) x is superior to y by the first criterion P 1 or (2) x is superior to y by the second criterion P 2 when x and y are not comparable by P 1 . Houy and Tadenuma (2009) scrutinize differences between the two ways of decisionmaking with a given pair of preference relations: one is a Rational Shortlist Method and the other is to construct the (single) lexicographic composition and then maximize it. Despite the differences, the lexicographic composition plays a key role to connect Rational Shortlist Methods with Grouping Choice Methods, as seen below.
Let a pair of preference relations (P 1 , P 2 ) be given. Suppose that there exist a grouping rule G and a preference relation P such that 
Axiomatic Characterization of Grouping Choice Methods
In this section, we define three natural properties of choice functions. Then, we show that Grouping Choice Methods satisfy all these properties, and conversely, every choice function satisfying the three properties is a Grouping Choice Method.
The first property is standard choice-consistency under the expansion of available alternatives. It says that if an alternative is chosen in each of the two sets of available alternatives, then it should be chosen in the union of the two sets.
The next property is a weaker version of Samuelson's WARP, which was introduced by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) . This axiom requires that if an alternative x is chosen in {x, y} and a set S containing both x and y, then y should not be chosen in any "intermediate" set between {x, y} and S.
Weak WARP: For all x, y ∈ X and all S, T ∈ X , if {x, y} ⊆ T ⊆ S and
The third property says that if an alternative y is never chosen in the presence of another alternative x, then (1) whenever y is chosen in a menu (in the absence of x) and then x becomes newly available, x should be chosen in the new menu (that is, x "eliminates" the initial winner y), or (2) whenever both x and y are present, eliminating y from the menu dose not affect the choice.
Elimination:
For all x, y ∈ X, if y ̸ = C(S) for every S ∈ X with x ∈ S, then (1) for every S ∈ X with x ̸ ∈ S and y = C(S), x = C(S ∪ {x}), or (2) for every S ∈ X with x ∈ S and y ∈ S, C(S) = C(S \ {y}).
Our next theorem shows that the above three properties characterize Grouping Choice Methods.
Theorem 2. A choice function satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and Elimination if and only if it is a Grouping Choice Method.
In the Appendix, we show that the three axioms in Theorem 2 are independent.
Grouping Path Independence
To present our final characterization of Grouping Choice Methods, we need to introduce some additional definitions. The idea behind the following definitions is simple. Given a grouping in some set S, we consider two ways to change it.
In one way, we merge two groups into one and iterate this operation to obtain a new grouping. In the other way, we split a group into two groups and iterate it.
Let S ∈ X . Let S 1 and S 2 be two families of subsets of S. We say that
Then, we say that a family T of subsets of S is obtained by iteratively merging (resp., iteratively splitting) from a family S if there exists a sequence of families of subsets of S, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S ℓ such that S 1 = S, S ℓ = T , and for all h ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ − 1}, S h+1 is obtained by merging (resp., splitting) from S h . Let 
Notice that the grouping consisting only of the whole set S is obtained by iteratively merging from any grouping in S. Hence, the above condition is equivalent to the following: For every S ∈ X , and every T
∈ {G(S)}∪G(G(S)),

C(S) = C({C(T j ) | T j ∈ T }).
We are now ready to state our third characterization of Grouping Choice Methods.
Theorem 3. Let a grouping rule G be given. A choice function C satisfies Grouping Path Independence for G if and only if it is a Grouping Choice
Method with G and some asymmetric binary relation P .
We note that the necessity part of the above theorem does not rely on the property (G3) of grouping rules. Hence, this part holds in the class of grouping rules that satisfy (G1) and (G2) but not necessarily (G3). This means that a choice function satisfying Grouping Path Independence can be rationalized by a preference relation in more general cases of grouping.
Properties of Grouping Rules and Rationality of Choice
A key to determine properties of a Grouping Choice Method is the grouping rule. If we take the finest grouping {{x} | x ∈ S} or the coarsest grouping {S}, then the grouping choice method is simply the classical rational choice function. Between the two extremes, there are a variety of cases. Depending on which grouping rules are admissible, the degree of rationality of grouping choice methods varies.
We consider grouping rules that satisfy three conditions (G1) to (G3).
However, there may be some situations to which it is not appropriate to require (G3). Consider again the example in which a family buys a house. They divide available houses into groups by their locations. Suppose that the set of all houses is X = {x, y, z, w} where x and y are located in district a of town A, z is located in another district b of town A, and w is located in another town B. If the set of available houses is {x, z, w}, then she divides it into {x, z} and {w} because x and z are located in the same town and w is located in the other town. But when she faces {x, y, z}, she might divide {x, y, z} into {x, y} and {z} because x and y are located in the same district and z is located in another district. This is a violation of (G3). The condition (G3) requires that any two alternatives that are in a group in some situation of choice should be in a group in any other situations. However, there may be cases in which two alternatives in a group get separated with a change of the whole menu.
Without (G3), however, much of rationality of choice will be lost.
In fact, we can construct an example of a Grouping Choice
Method that violates both Expansion and Weak WARP. Consider again the above example of choosing a house.
Let G be such that 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduce a new, natural procedure of decision making, called a Grouping Choice Method. We clarify the relationships between the two distinct procedures, Rational Shortlist Methods and Grouping Choice Methods.
We also axiomatically characterize Grouping Choice Methods by using new
properties.
An advantages of our grouping procedure lies in its simplicity. Grouping before maximization is quite common in every day decision-makings. Moreover, our method assumes only one preference relation for a DM, as in the classical theory. We do not need to imagine more complex DMs with multiple
criteria. Yet the outcomes of choice are the same as those in the case where the DMs would sequentially maximize their multiple preference relations. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
We first introduce additional definitions and notation. Let a grouping rule G be given. For all x, y ∈ X, define x ↔ y as
That is, x ↔ y means that x and y belong to the same group in some subset S ∈ X . Notice that the following relation holds since the grouping rule satisfies (G3).
x ↔ y ⇔ ∀S ∈ X : ∃S i ∈ G(S) such that {x, y} ⊆ S i
That is, the relation x ↔ y also means x and y belong to the same group in every subset of X. We write not[x ↔ y] as x ̸ ↔ y:
Given a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ), define the binary relation P * 2 as follows (Houy and Tadenuma, 2009, p.1776): for all x, y ∈ X, x P * 2 y ⇔ x and y are not comparable in P 1 and x P 2 y.
Given P ∈ P, define the transitive closure T (P ) of P as follows: for all
To prove theorems, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ) sequentially rationalizes a choice function C. Then the following claims hold.
(a) P 1 is acyclic.
(b) For all S ∈ X , M (M (S; P 1 ); P * 2 ) = M (M (S; P 1 ); P 2 ) holds. That is, (P 1 , P * 2 ) also sequential rationalizes C.
(c) For all x, y ∈ X with x ̸ = y, x and y are comparable in one and only one of P 1 and P * 2 .
Proof. Assume that a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ) sequentially rationalized a choice function C. (b) Let S ∈ X . For all x, y ∈ M (S; P 1 ), x and y are not comparable in P 1 , and hence x P 2 y holds if and only if x P * 2 y holds. Therefore, M (M (S; P 1 );
(c) Assume that x and y are neither comparable in P 1 nor in P * 2 . By the above claim, (P 1 , P * 2 ) sequentially rationalizes C. Then, we have {x, y} = M (M ({x, y} ; P 1 ); P * 2 ) = C(S). This contadicts C(S) is a singleton for every S ∈ X . Hence, x and y must be comparable in P 1 or P * 2 . By the definition of P * 2 , x and y are comparable in only one of P 1 and P * 2 .
Lemma 2. Assume that a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ) sequentially rationalizes a choice function C. Let S ∈ X and x = C(S). Then, the following claims hold.
(d) There exists no y ∈ S such that y P 1 x.
(e) For every y ∈ S, if y P * 2 x, then there exist k alternatives z 1 , . . . , z k ∈ S \ {x, y} with k ≥ 1 such that
Proof. Since x = C(S) = M (M (S; P 1 ); P 2 ), we have x ∈ M (S; P 1 ). Hence,
Assume that y ∈ S and y P * 2 x. By claim (b) in Lemma 1, x = M (M (S; P 1 ); P * 2 ). If there exists no z 1 ∈ S with z 1 P 1 y, then y ∈ M (S; P 1 ) holds, and x ̸ ∈ M (M (S; P 1 ); P * 2 ), which is a contradiction. Hence, there exists z 1 ∈ S with z 1 P 1 y. If z 1 = x, then x P 1 y, which contradicts y P * 2 x. Thus, Then, we have x P 1 z k or x P * 2 z k .
Lemma 3.
Assume that a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ) sequentially rationalizes a choice function C and satisfies the following property:
Then, (T (P 1 ), P * 2 ) also sequentially rationalizes C.
Proof. Assume that (P 1 , P 2 ) sequentially rationalizes C and satisfies Property T. Let S ∈ X and x = C(S). By claim (b) in Lemma 1, x = M (M (S; P 1 ); P * 2 ). Now we prove x = M (M (S; T (P 1 )); P * 2 ). First we show x ∈ M (S; T (P 1 )). Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists y ∈ S with y T (P 1 ) x. By claim (d) in Lemma 2, y P 1 x does not hold. Then, by Property T, we have y P * 2 x. It follows from claim (e) in Lemma 2 that there exists z ∈ S such that z T (P 1 ) y and [x P 1 z or x P * 2 z]. By z T (P 1 ) y and y T (P 1 ) x, we have z T (P 1 ) x. Then, Property T implies that [z P 1 x or z P * 2 x]. However, [x P 1 z or x P * 2 z] and [z P 1 x or z P * 2 x] are incompatible because (i) both P 1 and P * 2 are asymmetric, and (ii) by the definition of P * 2 , x P 1 z and z P * 2 x are incompatible, and so as x P * 2 z and z P 1 x. Hence, we have x ∈ M (S; T (P 1 )).
. Notice that P * 2 is complete in M (S; P 1 ) by claim (c) in Lemma 1. Hence, it is also complete in M (S; T (P 1 )).
Thus, we have x = M (M (S; T (P 1 )); P * 2 ).
Lemma 4. Assume that a choice function C is a Grouping Choice Method with
an asymmetric binary relation P and a grouping rule G. Then, the following claims hold:
(h) For every S ∈ X and all x, y ∈ S, if x ↔ y and y P x, then x ̸ = C(S).
(i): For every S ∈ X and all x, y ∈ S, if y P x and x = C(S), then there
exists z ∈ S \ {x, y} such that x P z, z P y, and y ↔ z.
Proof.
Claim (f). For all x, y ∈ X, C({x, y}) is a single element in {x, y}. Hence,
we have x P y or y P x.
Claim (g). Suppose, on the contrary, that S ∈ X and for all x, y ∈ S, x ↔ y but M (S; P ) = ∅. Since S is finite and P is asymmetric and complete, P contains a cycle in A, that is, there exist x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ∈ S with n ≥ 3 such that x i P x i+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and x n P x 1 .
Take minimal j ∈ {3, . . . , n} such that x j P x 1 . Because P is complete,
we have x 1 P x j−1 , x j−1 P x j , and
the initial supposition, we have v ↔ w for all v, w ∈ T . Then it must be the case that
If T ∈ G(T ), it follows from (G2) in the definition of Grouping Rules,
we also have
which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be the case that M (S; P ) ̸ = ∅.
Claim (h). Assume that S ∈ X , x, y ∈ S, x ↔ y, and yP x.
Claim (i). Assume that S ∈ X , x, y ∈ S, y P x, and x = C(S). If y
, then y P x and x = C(S) are incompatible. Hence,
We now prove Theorems 1 and 2 together in the following three parts:
Part 1: to show that every Grouping Choice Method satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and Elimination.
Part 2: to show that if a choice function satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and Elimination, then it is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive.
Part 3: to show that if a choice function is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive, then it is a Grouping Choice Method.
Part 1:
We show that every Grouping Choice Method satisfies Weak WARP, Expansion, and Elimination.
Let C be a Grouping Choice Function with an asymmetric binary relation P and a grouping rule G.
Weak WARP:
Assume T ∈ X and x = C({x, y}) = C(T ). Let S ∈ X be a set such that {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T . By x = C({x, y}), we have x P y. It follows from x = C(T )
and Claim (h) in Lemma 4 that there exists no z ∈ T such that x ↔ z and z P x. Because S ⊆ T , there exists no z ∈ S with x ↔ z and z P x. Then,
Claim (i) in Lemma 4 and x P y together imply y ̸ = C(S).
Expansion:
Suppose, on the contrary, that
Then, by Claim (i) in Lemma 4, there exists z ∈ S ∪ T with z ↔ x and z P x.
Without loss of generality, assume z ∈ S. It follows from Claim (h) in Lemma
, which is a contradiction. Thus, x = C(S ∪ T ) must hold.
Elimination:
Let x, y ∈ X. Assume that y ̸ = C(A) for all A ∈ X with x ∈ A. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist S, T ∈ X such that y = C(S), x ̸ = C(S ∪ {x}),
{y}). Let v = C(S ∪ {x}) and w = C(T ).
In the following, we have seven steps to derive a contradiction.
Step 1: We show that v ̸ = x, y and w ̸ = x, y.
By the assumption and the supposition, v ̸ = x, y and w ̸ = y. Moreover, if
by the assumption and C satisfies Expansion. Therefore, we have w ̸ = x.
Step 2: We show x P y, x ↔ y, y P v, v ̸ ↔ y, and v P x.
Since v ̸ = x, we have v ∈ S. Because y = C(S) and C satisfies Weak WARP, it must be the case that y = C({v, y}). Hence, y P v. Step 3: We show y P w and w ↔ y. Thus, y P w, and w ↔ y.
Step 4: We show w ̸ ↔ x.
Assume not: let w ↔ x. Then, by this assumption and the above steps, we have w ↔ x, w ↔ y, and x ↔ y. It follows from Claim (g) in Lemma 4 that M ({w, x, y} ; P ) ̸ = ∅. From Step 2 and Step 3, we have x P y and y P w which imply x = M ({w, x, y} ; P ). Then, by asymmetry of P , we have x P w.
From the combination of x P w and w ↔ x, Claim (h) in Lemma 4 states that
It is a contradiction. Hence, we have w ̸ ↔ x.
Step 5: We show v ̸ = w, x P w, w P v, v ↔ w, and x = C({v, w, x, y}). Step 6: We show that there exists t ∈ T \ {x, w} such that t ̸ = v, y, w P t, t P x, and t ↔ x.
Since w = C(T ) and x P w by Step 5, It follows from Claim (h) in Lemma 4 that there exists t ∈ T \ {x, w} such that w P t, t P x, and t ↔ x. Because
Step 5, it must be the case that t ̸ = v, y.
Step 7: We show that none of t, v, w, x, and y is equal to C({t, v, w, x, y}), which is a contradiction.
By
Step 2 Define P 1 and P 2 as follows: For all a, b ∈ X with a ̸ = b,
Then, by Dutta and Horan (2013, Proposition 1 and Lemma 4), (P 1 , P * 2 ) sequentially rationalizes C. 4 By Lemma 3, if (P 1 , P * 2 ) satisfies Property T:
then (T (P 1 ), P * 2 ) also sequentially rationalizes C, which means that C is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive. Therefore, it remains to show that (P 1 , P * 2 ) satisfies Property T. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist z 1 , . . . , z n ∈ X such that z i P 1 z i+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} but neither z 1 P 1 z n nor z 1 P * 2 z n holds. Then, n ≥ 3. Because (P 1 , P * 2 ) sequentially rationalizes C, we have z n = C({z 1 , z n }) and
Moreover, by the definition
However, since z j P 1 z j+1 , it follows that z j+1 ̸ = C(S) for all S ∈ X with z j ∈ S. Then, by Elimination, one of the claims (i) and (ii) cannot hold, which is a contradiction. Thus, (P 1 , P * 2 ) satisfies Property T.
Part 3:
We show that if a choice function is a Rational Shortlist Method in which the first rationale is transitive, then it is a Grouping Choice Method.
Assume that a choice function C is sequentially rationalized by a pair of asymmetric binary relations (P 1 , P 2 ) and P 1 is transitive. Define a binary relation P as follows: For all x, y ∈ X with x ̸ = y,
Then, P is asymmetric.
For every S ∈ X , let g(S) be the class of all subsets S i of S such that for all x, y ∈ S i with x ̸ = y, either x P 1 y or y P 1 x holds. Then, we define a 4 We are grateful to Sean Horan for suggesting that this part of the proof could be shortened by using the results in Dutta and Horan (2013).
5 Note that (P correspondence G as follows:
That is, G(S) is the class of "maximal" subsets (in inclusion relations) of S in which every element is comparable with every other element in P 1 .
Now we check that G is a grouping rule, that is, for every S ∈ X , G(S)
satisfies the conditions (G1), (G2), and (G3) in Definition 2.
(G1) By the definition of G,
(G2) By the definition of G, it satisfies (G2).
(G3) Assume that there exists
{x, y} ⊆ T . By definition, either x P 1 y or y P 1 x holds. This implies
Next, we show that C is a grouping choice method with P and G. Let S ∈ X and x = C(S). First, we prove that there exists S k ∈ G(S) such that
It follows from x = C(S) and Lemma 2 that y P 1 x does not hold. Because y is comparable with x in P 1 , it must be the case that x P 1 y. Then, we have
. By the definition of P , x P y. This holds for every y ∈ S i \ {x}.
Thus, we have x = M (S i ; P ).
Second, we show x P y for every y ∈ S \ {x} such that y = M (S j ; P ) for some S j ∈ G(S). Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists y ∈ S such that y = M (S j ; P ) for some S j ∈ G(S) but x P y does not hold. By the definition of y}) , and hence y = C({x, y}). Then, either y P 1 x or y P * 2 x. Since x = C(S), it cannot be the case that y P 1 x. It follows from y P * 2 x and Claim (e) in Lemma 2 that there exists w ∈ S with w P 1 y. Then, w = C({y, w}).
Hence, we have w P y. Because y = M (S j ; P ), it follows that w ̸ ∈ S j .
If S j = {y}, it contradicts {w, y} ∈ g(S) and the construction of G. Hence, we have |S j | ≥ 2. Let z ∈ S j \ {y}. Then, either z P 1 y or y P 1 z holds. If z P 1 y, then z = C({y, z}), which implies z P y, which contradicts y = M (S j ; P ).
Thus, y P 1 z must be the case. It follows from w P 1 y and transitivity of P 1 that w P 1 z. This holds for every z ∈ S j \ {y}. Hence, we have S j ∪ {w} ∈ g(S), which contradicts S j ∈ G(S).
Independence of the Axioms in Theorem 2
The three axioms, Expansion, Weak WARP, and Elimination in Theorem 2 are independent in the sense that no two axioms imply the other. The following examples illustrate choice functions that satisfy two of the axioms while violating the third. 6 All the three choice functions are defined on X = {x, y, z, w}.
Expansion:
we can check that C satisfies Weak WARP and Elimination. However, C
Weak WARP:
can check that C satisfies Expansion and Elimination. However, C violates Weak WARP because z = C(x, z) = C(X) but y = C(y, z, w). 
Elimination:
Define x = C(x, y) = C(x, z) = C(x, y, z), y = C(y, z) = C(y, z, w) = C(X), z = C(z, w) = C(x, z, w), w = C(x, w) = C(y, w) = C(x,
Proof of Theorem 3
To prove the theorem, we use a standard property of choice consistency. It says that if an alternative in a set S "wins" over every other alternative in S in binary choices, then it should be chosen in S.
Condorcet Consistency: For every S ∈ X , if there exists x ∈ S such that x = C({x, y}) for every y ∈ S \ {x}, then x = C(S).
The following lemma may be interesting of itself. 
Hence, we have x = C(S).
Second, assume G(S) ̸ = {S}. Let G(S) = {S 1 , . . . , S n } where n ≥ 2.
Without loss of generality, assume x ∈ S 1 . Consider the family of subsets of S,
which is obtained by iteratively merging from G(S).
From condition (G2) in the definition of grouping rules, it cannot be the case 
Therefore we have x = C(S).
S k ∈ G(S) with y ∈ S k . From Claims (f) and (g) in Lemma 4, M (S k ; P ) = {z} for some z ∈ S k . Because y P x and x = M (∪ S j ∈G(S) M (S j ; P ); P ), it must be the case that z ̸ = y. Hence, z P y and y ↔ z. There exists T h ∈ Σ such that z ∈ T h ⊆ S k . Then, z P w for every w ∈ T h \ {z}. Therefore,
It follows from z P y, y ↔ z, z ∈ ∪ T i ∈Σ C(T i ),
and Claim (h) in Lemma 4 that y ̸ = C(∪ T i ∈Σ C(T i )), which is a contradiction.
Thus, we have x = C(∪ T i ∈Σ C(T i )).
[Necessity]
Assume that a choice function C satisfies Grouping Path Independence for G.
Define a binary relation P as follows: For all x, y ∈ X, x P y ⇔ x = C({x, y}).
Because either C({x, y}) = x or C({x, y}) = y holds, P is complete and asymmetric. Hence, for every A ∈ X , |M (A; P )| ≤ 1.
Let S ∈ X and x = C(S). We show that {x} = M (∪ S j ∈G(S) M (S j ; P ); P ).
First, we show that {x} = M (S k ; P ) for some S k ∈ G(S). Suppose, on the contrary, x ̸ ∈ M (S j ; P ) for all S j ∈ G(S) with x ∈ S j . Then, for every S j ∈ G(S) with x ∈ S j , there exists y j ∈ S j such that y j P x. By definition, Second, we show x P y for every y ∈ S such that {y} = M (S j ; P ) for some S j ∈ G(S). Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists y ∈ S such that {y} = M (S j ; P ) for some S j ∈ G(S) and y P x. Because P is complete, it follows that for every z ∈ S j , y P z, and hence y = C({y, z}). Since 
